In a recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland affirmed the notion that discrimination on the basis of race and discrimination based on national origin are distinct legal claims. Moreover, because 42 USC § 1981 only prohibits discrimination based on race, a claim alleging national origin discrimination under the Act has little chance of success. Let’s take a closer look at this interesting decision.
Background facts
Zareen Quraishi was born in Pakistan and received a bachelor’s degree and certification as a registered information technician while residing in Houston, Texas. She began working as a health information management service Baltimore-area manager at Kaiser Foundation Health Plan in February 2006. She received satisfactory evaluations of her job performance in July 2006 and February 2007. In February 2008, she received an “excellence” award from Kaiser’s Baltimore-area administrator and medical director in recognition of her performance, dedication, and personal commitment.
At some point in 2008, Quraishi’s supervisor, Leilani Bradley, mimicked her accent in a meeting with two other area managers. After that, the two managers frequently mimicked Quraishi’s accent despite her complaints to Bradley.
In July 2008, Quraishi met with Bradley, who informed her that she was being terminated. Quraishi objected, complaining that she hadn’t even received a warning. As a result, Bradley put her on a performance improvement plan (PIP). Although her performance met the requirements specified in the PIP, Bradley informed her on October 21, 2008, that she didn’t believe her improved performance would continue. She then offered Quraishi the option of either resigning with severance pay or being discharged.
Quraishi opted to resign effective November 4, 2008. She then filed a lawsuit alleging race discrimination in violation of 42 USC § 1981. Kaiser responded that the factual allegations in her complaint pointed to national origin, not race, as the basis for her claim. Because 42 USC § 1981 covers only claims of race discrimination, Kaiser requested that her claim be dismissed.
Court’s decision
According to the court, § 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race but doesn’t provide protection for individuals based solely on their “place or nation of origin.” The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the term “race” broadly for purposes of § 1981, concluding that when Congress enacted the statute, lawmakers intended to protect identifiable classes of people who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.
The court found two guiding principles in determining whether a claim based on place of origin creates a § 1981 claim of race discrimination. First, the employee must demonstrate that she actually faced intentional discrimination based on her ancestry or ethnic characteristics rather than merely her place of origin. Second, if her allegations reference only the place of origin and don’t focus on specific ethnic characteristics associated with that place of origin, § 1981 doesn’t apply.
In this case, Quraishi appeared to base her § 1981 claim on a broad construction of race, essentially claiming she suffered race discrimination because of her Pakistani ancestry or ethnicity. She stated that she was born in Pakistan to native Pakistani parents and she is and appears to be of a race of Homo sapiens that characteristically inhabit South Asia. She further stated that she is a member of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive subgroup.
However, in her complaint, Quraishi alleged only that Bradley and two African-American managers mimicked her accent, the two managers were hired without the requisite certification that she possessed, and they were given support staff that she wasn’t given until late in her tenure. According to the court, her evidence was insufficient to invoke the broad construction of race under § 1981. Instead, if anything, it was indicative of national origin discrimination, which isn’t covered under § 1981.
Moreover, while Quraishi mentioned that she was born in Pakistan, she failed to refer to any specific ethnic characteristics associated with her Pakistani origin that might suggest that applying the broad definition of race is appropriate in her case. Consequently, the court couldn’t infer from the totality of the evidence that she was arguing that her Pakistani ethnicity motivated the discrimination. Accordingly, to the extent that she sought to base her allegation of race discrimination on the fact that she is South Asian and of Pakistani origin, her § 1981 claim failed. Zareen Quraishi v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., et al., MDDC, Civil No. CCB-13-0010, decided May 30, 2013.
Bottom line
Claims of national origin discrimination are often combined with claims of race discrimination. Sometimes, it’s difficult to separate the essential elements for claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which covers national origin as well as race discrimination, from claims under § 1981, which covers only race discrimination. Quraishi undoubtedly proceeded under § 1981 because the statute of limitations had run for any claims under Title VII. If she had filed a timely Title VII claim of national origin discrimination, her luck in court might have been better.
Kevin McCormick is a partner with the Baltimore firm Whiteford, Taylor & Preston and chair of its Labor and Employment Section. He may be contacted at kmccormick@wtplaw.com.