The decision in Quinn v. St. Louis Co. illuminates a fine line for employers. While eligible workers must be granted unpaid time off for qualifying serious health conditions under the FMLA, the court showed that interference must have material consequences – such as actual denial of time off – for employees to make a convincing case that their rights were interfered with under the law.
The FMLA prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining or denying an employee’s use or attempt to use rights contained in the law (29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(1)). Interference includes not only refusing to authorize leave but discouraging the employee from using leave. That prohibition also extends to “manipulation by a covered employer to avoid responsibilities under [the] FMLA,” the court noted, citing 29 C.F.R. §825.220(b).
Harassed into Quitting?
Ellen Quinn reported to her employer in 2007 that she had been sexually harassed by a county commissioner. The county launched an investigation and eventually came to a settlement with Quinn that released the county from legal liability on her charge in exchange for the county’s promise that it would not terminate her except for just cause for seven years.
After her complaint to the county, Quinn experienced stress, anxiety and depression. On the advice of her doctor, she took 12 weeks of FMLA leave. But when she returned, she reported that she was excluded from out-of-state marketing meetings and workshops and from changing video and sound systems (among her job duties). She also said that other employees accused her of lying about the sexual harassment, that her office was moved and that when she painted her office a custom color it was immediately repainted white.
Early in 2008, the county hired the attorney who represented Quinn’s alleged sexual harasser to be her new boss. She reported that the new boss called her a “problem employee” and made other statements that added to her stress. Quinn asked for a new supervisor but was refused. In the following months the new boss said she was late turning in an assignment that she had in fact turned in on time, yelled at her in front of coworkers and warned her about alleged tardiness, insisting she obtain advance approval for any absences. He also said future requests for FMLA leave might be denied.
Quinn’s doctor recommended she take leave to reduce her anxiety and depression. She used sick leave until FMLA time became available. When that ran out her boss asked for a medical exam to confirm her need for full-time, non-FMLA leave. An independent physician’s examination confirmed that she was unable to work for the county and sent her boss a letter to that effect.
Quinn sued in 2009, arguing the county interfered with and retaliated against her for using the FMLA, among other claims. St. Louis County countered that it repeatedly expressed appreciation for Quinn’s work and a desire for her to return. A federal district court denied her claims and granted summary judgment to the county.
‘Materially Adverse’ Action Not There
On Quinn’s FMLA interference claim, the appeals court agreed that discouraging or manipulating the employee to avoid the county’s responsibilities would be unlawful.
“However, the employee must also show that the employer denied the employee entitlements under the FMLA,” said the appellate court, citing Wisbey v. City of Lincoln. As in Quinn, Wisbey “was never denied FMLA leave and, therefore, has not shown that she was entitled to any benefit that was denied,” the 8th Circuit said in that case.
“Quinn does not contest the district court’s finding that she received the full twelve weeks of FMLA leave to which she was entitled each year she requested it,” the 8th Circuit said (29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1), providing that eligible employees are entitled to 12 weeks of medical leave each year). “Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted on Quinn’s FMLA interference claim,” the court ruled.
No Retaliation, Either
Quinn had also sued St. Louis County for retaliation under the FMLA, but the appeals court again sided with her employer.
“To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, an employee must show that she engaged in activity protected under the Act, that she suffered an adverse employment action by the employer, and that a causal connection existed between the employee’s action and the adverse employment action,” said the appellate court, quoting from Darby v. Bratch.
“Quinn failed to generate an issue of fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action,” the court found. “The only adverse employment action Quinn asserted in the context of her FMLA retaliation claim was constructive discharge, which, as we have explained, the record does not support…. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted on Quinn’s FMLA retaliation claim.”