The U.S. Supreme Court on March 25 vacated and remanded an appeals court ruling that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not require employers to accommodate pregnant employees.
In Young v. UPS, the 4th Circuit held that UPS did not violate the PDA by limiting light-duty accommodations to employees: (1) injured on the job; (2) disabled as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act; or (3) legally unable to work as truck drivers due to a loss of their U.S. Department of Transportation certification, the court held. A corporate policy that does not provide light-duty for off-the-job injuries (that don’t rise to the level of a disability) is a “neutral and legitimate business practice,” it determined. (See full story.)
In appealing to the Supreme Court, Peggy Young alleged that the 4th Circuit disregarded the PDA’s statutory text. The law states that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” Although the 4th Circuit noted that the three categories of workers UPS accommodates are different from pregnant workers in other respects, it ignored their similarity in the only relevant respect: their “ability or inability to work,” Young’s petition argued.
High Court Weighs in
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case late last year.
Young and the Solicitor General
Both Young and the Solicitor General argued that if an employer provides accommodations for on-the-job injuries but not those sustained outside of work, it still must provide pregnant workers with those accommodations. The court, however, disagreed that the PDA necessarily requires such action. That requirements would grant pregnant workers a “most-favored-nation” status, something Congress likely did not intend, the Court said.
In addition, disparate-treatment law normally permits an employer to implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected class, even if their implementation sometimes harms those members, as long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason for doing so, the Court said.
UPS
UPS, on the other hand, argued that the PDA’s language does nothing more than prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy, and the Court was again unpersuaded.
Congress’ intent in passing the PDA to amend Title VII was to overturn General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). In that case, the Supreme Court considered a company plan that provided off-the-job sickness and accident benefits to all employees without providing benefits for absences due to pregnancy. The Court held that the plan did not violate Title VII because the distinction was not pretext for gender discrimination, it concluded. The employer did not distinguish between pregnant women and others because of pregnancy; it distinguished between them on a neutral ground: sickness and accidents. The PDA was crafted to overrule that holding and to illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied, the Young court said.
Court’s Ruling
The Court instead held in a 6-3 opinion that Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from hers. “It is left to the Fourth Circuit to determine on remand whether Young also created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’ reasons for having treated Young less favorably than these other nonpregnant employees were pretextual,” the court said vacating and remanding the suit.
The court instructed the 4th Circuit to employ the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden-shifting framework. Under that standard, an employee first alleges discrimination by pointing to employer action from which one can infer discrimination. Then, the employer can refute that claim by showing that it relied on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. (The court noted that in cases likeYoung, this reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnancy to the list of criteria making a worker eligible for light-duty.) The burden then shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s offered reason is pretext for discrimination.
“Here, for example, if the facts are as Young says they are, she can show that UPS accommodates most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations,” the Court suggested. “Young might also add that the fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong — to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”
EEOC Guidance
The Court also rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that the court should give weight to the EEOC’s new guidance requiring accommodations for pregnant employees. (See EEOC: Pregnant Employees Entitled to Accommodation.) The document lacks the timing, consistency and thoroughness of consideration necessary to give it power to persuade, the court said, citing its own standard. “The guideline was promulgated after certiorari was granted here; it takes a position on which previous EEOC guidelines were silent; it is inconsistent with positions long advocated by the Government; and the EEOC does not explain the basis for its latest guidance.”
Following the court’s decision, EEOC announced that it would revise its guidance. “The Commission’s pregnancy discrimination guidance comports with some but not all aspects of the Court’s decision. The Commission will make necessary changes to the guidance, in accordance with the decision,” it said.
But in a prepared statement, EEOC Chair Jenny R. Yang called the ruling a “clear win” for women and families. “The Court’s analysis reflects the broad protection Congress intended when it passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978,” she said. The commission’s general counsel, P. David Lopez, added that EEOC remains committed to vigorous enforcement of the prohibitions against pregnancy discrimination.